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S054868

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

KAHLID IQBAL KHAWAR,

)
)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

)
)

)

V.

)
)

GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC.

)
)

Defendant and Petitioner.

)

__________________________________________

)

PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Appeal from the Judgment of the Superior Court
of the State of California, County of Los Angeles
the Honorable Richard G. Harris, Judge
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal,
Second District, Division Seven
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On March 14, 1990, Khalid Iqbal Khawar,

("Respondent"), sued

Roundtable Publishing, Inc., Robert Morrow and Globe
International, Inc.,

("Globe") for defamation.

Transcript ("R.T.") 137.)

(Reporter's

Respondent and Roundtable Publishing,

Inc., settled their dispute prior to trial. See Khawar v. Globe
Int'l, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92, 98, rev, granted 57 Cal. Rptr.
2d 277 (1996).

The superior court entered default judgment

1

against Robert Morrow.

See id.

After a jury trial, the court

entered judgment on special verdict against Globe on April 15,
1994.

(R.T. 3110.)

figure.

The court held that Respondent was a private

(R.T. 2735).

Moreover, contrary to the jury's advisory

finding, the judge held that the Globe article was not an
accurate and neutral report.

(R.T. 2740.)

Furthermore, the

court ruled that Globe published the article with actual malice.
(R.T. 2760, 2763.)

The jury awarded Respondent $100,000 for harm

to reputation, $400,000 for emotional distress, $175,000 for
presumed damages and $500,000 in punitive damages.

(R.T. 2783,

2791.)
Globe filed a timely notice of appeal on June 6, 1994.
Khawar, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.

See

The court of appeal affirmed the

trial court's judgment on June 5, 1996,

See id. at 111.

This

Court subsequently granted review on September 25, 1996.
Statement of Facts
Respondent was a member of the press covering the 1968
presidential primary victory speech of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.
(R.T. 1338.)

He purposely arrived early in the evening to have

his picture ta]cen with Senator Kennedy,

(R.T. 1340.)

Respondent

then placed himself on the podium next to the Senator during his
presentation.

(R.T. 1339.)

After Senator Kennedy had been shot.

Respondent began taking pictures of bystanders who had also been
shot or were otherwise caught in the rampage.

(R.T. 1341.)

Subsequently, Respondent was questioned by the Los Angeles Police
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Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigations, to whom he
identified himself only as Khalid Iqbal.

(R.T, 1342, 1351-52.)

Following the assassination. Respondent gained public
notoriety in connection with the controversy.

(R.T. 1604-06.)

He was pictured next to Senator Kennedy on the cover of the June
14, 1968, edition of Time, which he purchased as a reminder of
his connection to the event.

(R.T. 1392.)

Moreover, Robert

Kaiser referred to Respondent in the 1970 book RFK Must Die,
questioning why Respondent had not been interviewed in connection
with the assassination.

(R.T. 1408.)

Finally, Respondent was

not surprised to see himself on television frequently in
connection with Senator Kennedy's assassination, but actually
recorded those programs.

(R.T. 1393.)

In 1989, the Globe reported on the publication of ex-CIA
agent Robert Morrow's book. The Senator Must Die.
3146.)

(R.T. 848,

The book alleged that Respondent was a participant in the

assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

(R.T. 3146.)

The

Globe's report consisted of the article and a photograph, from
Mr. Morrow's book, showing Respondent standing on the podium,
near Senator Kennedy, prior to the assassination.

(R.T, 3146.)

As to the content of the article, Mr. Jonathan L. Kirsch,
contributor to the Los Angeles Times and expert witness for the
Globe, testified that the article was an accurate and fair report
of the contents of the book.

(R.T. 1583, 1594.)

In addition,

Mr. Kirsch testified that the Globe did not endorse the
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propositions in Mr. Morrow's book/ as evidenced by the fact that
the article only repeated what Mr. Morrow alleged in his book.
{R.T. 1595.)

Furthermore, Mr. Kirsch testified that the use of

disclaimers such as "Mr. Morrow claims," is a standard
journalistic tool to distance the author from the allegations
that he or she reports.

(R.T. 1596.)

Mr. Blackburn did, however, attempt to contact Ali Ahmand
through the Los Angeles telephone directory, while unaware that
his real name was Khalid Iqbal Khawar.

(R.T. 1121.)

Mr. Blackburn also stated that he probably contacted his
acquaintance Colonel Prouty, a conspiracy expert and the author
of the forward for The Senator Must Die.

(R.T. 1084.)

He

likewise probably contacted Mr, Mankiewicz, a Robert Kennedy
campaign advisor, to verify the claims in the Morrow book,
1123.)

(R.T.

Finally, Mr, Blackburn was also well acquainted with Mr.

Thomas Naguchi, who performed the autopsy on Robert Kennedy and
led Mr. Blackburn to believe that there was more than one gunman.
(R.T. 1124.)

4

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether an individual becomes an involuntary limited-purpose
public figure by placing himself in the middle of a
publicized public controversy such as the presidential
primary election that ended in the candidate's
assassination.

2.

Whether the disinterested republication of newsworthy
allegations seeking to inform the public about a public
controversy, the assassination of a United States
Presidential candidate, is privileged under the neutral
reportage doctrine,

3.

Whether a magazine acts without actual malice when, lacking
serious doubts as to the truthfulness of the statements
contained therein, it publishes an article.

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent is an involuntary limited-purpose public figure
with regard to the public controversy surrounding the
assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy.

First, the

assassination of Senator Kennedy is an identifiable public
controversy of the rarest occurrence that effects more than the
active participants involved.

Second, Respondent played more

than a tangential or trivial role in the controversy surrounding
the death of Senator Kennedy when he placed himself in the vortex
of the public controversy.

Finally, the defamatory statements

directly relate to Respondent's role in the assassination
controversy.
An accurate and neutral republication of newsworthy charges
about a public figure are privileged under the doctrine of
neutral reportage.

Neutral reportage should be adopted in

California because it is rooted in the New York Times
constitutional protection for free press and the common law
privilege of fair report.

However, neutral reportage is a new

and coexistent constitutional protection, because it shields
republishers, regardless of their subjective doubt in the
substantive allegations.

Thus, the privilege preserves the First

Amendment rights of neutral and accurate republishers who seek to
inform the public about newsworthy events surrounding public
figures.

This privilege has been acknowledged in California case

law. Furthermore, the privilege can be invoked against private

6

plaintiffs because the focus of the privilege, neutral and
accurate republication, is mutually exclusive from the status of
the plaintiff.
Here, the neutral reportage privilege protects Globe, the
republisher, from liability.

Globe merely reported newsworthy

allegations made by Mr. Robert Morrow, a prominent and
responsible source, in his book The Senator Must Die.

Globe did

not concur or exaggerate in Mr. Morrow's allegations.

Globe

merely informed the public about the publication of the book as a
news event, allowing the public to determine the truth of the
allegations.
Finally, Globe lacked the necessary constitutional malice
required for Respondent to recover in this action.

Respondent

has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Globe
acted knowingly or with reckless disregard of the falsity of the
statements.

Even if this Court finds Respondent to be a private

figure, he still must prove constitutional malice in order to
recover presumed or punitive damages, because the statements
concern a public controversy,
ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONDENT IS AN INVOLUNTARY LIMITED-PURPOSE PUBLIC
FIGURE WITH REGARD TO THE PUBLIC CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING
THE ASSASSINATION OF SENATOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY.
Respondent became an involuntary public figure for the

limited purpose of discussing the assassination of Senator Robert
Kennedy when he placed himself at the very center of the

7

California presidential primary that resulted in the Senator's
demise.

The United States Supreme Court recognized the

involuntary public figure status over two decades ago when it
held that "hypothetically" it is possible for a person to become
a public figure "through no purposeful action of their own/" but
that such a situation would be extremely rare.
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974),

Gertz v. Robert

A plaintiff becomes an

involuntary limited-purpose public figure when (1) there exits an
identifiable public controversy,

(2) the plaintiff plays more

than a trivial or tangential role in the controversy, and (3) the
alleged defamatory statements are germane to the plaintiff's role
in that controversy.

See Bay View Packing Co. v, Taff, 543

N.W.2d 522, 531 (1995); cf. Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc.,
779 F.2d 736, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

Once a plaintiff has

attained such status he or she must prove constitutional "actual
malice" in order to recover in a defamation suit.
U.S. at 332.

See Gertz, 418

Plaintiff's public figure status is reviewed ^

novo, for it is a fact germane to the question of constitutional
malice.

See McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835, 842 (1986).

A. The Assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy Is an
Identifiable Public Controversy of the Rarest Occurrence
That Effects More Than the Active Participants Involved.
Respondent was involved in an "exceedingly rare" public
controversy: the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy.

A

public controversy exists when the "issue was being debated
publicly and . . . had foreseeable and substantial ramifications

8

for nonparticipants."
(1996)

Copp v, Paxton, 45 Cal. App. 4th 829, 844

(citing Waldbaum v, Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d

1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

For the court to determine whether

a public controversy exists it should look to see if "the press
was covering the debate, reporting what people were saying and
uncovering facts and theories to help the public formulate some
judgment."

Waldbaum, 627 F,2d at 1297.

In sum, the court should

ask if reasonable people who were not active participants in the
controversy would be affected by the outcome.

See id.

The Kennedy assassination is an identifiable public
controversy.

The assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy is

practically a per se public controversy, because it has been the
subject of heavy official and public scrutiny, including
conspiracy theories and historical treatises.

Indeed, nearly

three decades later, the public interest in the tragedy has not
abated.

Even today books and articles are published reexamining

the happenings of that fateful event, which sometimes ignore
official conclusions and ask what "really" happened.

For

example, Jonathan Bankin's Conspiracies, Coverups and Crimes,
published in 1991, even examines Respondent's possible role in
the assassination of Senator Kennedy.

(R.T, 1409.)

The

assassination of a United States Senator, a presidential
candidate and a member of the Kennedy family is a public
controversy of the broadest scope and the rarest occurrence.
Thus, the assassination of Robert Kennedy is a public
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controversy, the effects of which are felt beyond those directly
involved even to this day.

This assassination controversy is

precisely the exceedingly rare circumstance the Gertz Court
contemplated.

See 418 U.S. at 345.

B. Respondent Played More Than a Tangential or Trivial
Role in the Controversy Surrounding the Death of
Senator Robert Kennedy When He Placed Himself in the
Vortex of the Assassination.
After isolating the public controversy, the court then
examines the plaintiff's role in that controversy to determine
whether it was more than trivial or tangential.

See Bay View

Packing, 543 N.W.2d at 531; cf_^ Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297.
Though he did not desire to be drawn into the public controversy,
Respondent nonetheless played more than a tangential or trivial
role in the Robert Kennedy controversy when he was drawn into it
by "sheer bad luck" and by his own course of actions that invited
attention and comment.

The focus of the inquiry is on the

plaintiff's "role in the public controversy 'rather than on any
desire for publicity or other voluntary act' on their part."
View Packing, 543 N.W.2d at 533 (citation omitted)

Bay

(this focus

distinguishes the involuntary public figure analysis from that of
the voluntary public figure, because it does not require
voluntary "thrusting" into the public controversy).

Thus, a

defamation plaintiff can become a public figure through no
deliberate action of his or her own.

See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.

What is required is that the plaintiff's activities
"inevitably" draw them into the "vortex" of the public
controversy, Bay View Packing, 543 N.W.2d at 533 (citing Weigel
V.

Capital Times Co., 426 N.W.2d 43, 50 (1988)), even if by

"sheer bad luck."

Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742.

It is enough that

the plaintiff engaged in acts that were "bound to invite
attention and comment."

Bay View Packing, 543 N,W.2d at 533.

In

Bay View Packing, the state notified the meat processing company
("Bay View") that the local water supply had been contaminated
and any water used in processing meat should first be boiled.
543 N.W.2d at 525.

The state also recommended that Bay View

recall its distributed products.

See id.

However, not until the

United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") ordered Bay
View to recall its products from distribution did the company
comply.

See id.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that

through the "sheer bad luck" of the contamination, Bay View's
failure to comply with the advisory opinion of the state and the
FDA's recall recommendation, the company had voluntarily engaged
in a course of activity that resulted in their being inevitably
drawn into the vortex of the public controversy.

See id. at 533.

What is more. Bay View's inaction in light of the public concern
made its role more than tangential or trivial.

See id.

Here, by "sheer bad luck" of the assassination. Respondent's
own course of activities before and after the killing drew him
into the vortex of the public controversy surrounding the death
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of Senator Robert Kennedy.

Before Senator Kennedy took the stage

for his victory speech, Respondent pulled him aside to have his
picture taken with him.

(R.T. 1341.)

Respondent then took a

position very close to Senator Kennedy on the podium, presumably
to get the best shots of the event.

(R.T, 1339.)

As soon as

Senator Kennedy left the podium and was shot. Respondent began
taking photographs of bystanders who had also been shot or were
otherwise caught in the frenzy.

(R.T. 1341.)

Respondent was

subsequently question by the Los Angeles Police Department
("LAPD") and the Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI") on
several occasions and appeared on the cover of the June 14, 1968,
edition of Time standing next to Senator Kennedy.

(R.T. 1342,

1392.)
Accordingly, like in Bay View Packing, though Respondent did
not desire to become part of the public controversy surrounding
the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy, his voluntary
activities "inevitably" drew him into the "vortex" of the public
controversy.

Furthermore, Respondent testified to the fact that

he was not surprised to see himself on television an incalculable
number of times in connection with the assassination of Senator
Kennedy, and, in fact. Respondent has video recorded many of the
television programs for his personal use.

(R.T. 1393.)

Thus, it

is evident, even to the Respondent himself, that his acts on the
night of the killing drew him into the controversy.

Therefore,

following Bay View Packing, Respondent's role in this exceedingly

12

rare public controversy surrounding the death of Senator Kennedy
was more than tangential or trivial.
Where a plaintiff is drawn into a public controversy, even
by "sheer bad luck," and subject to official and non-official
investigation, he or she becomes an involuntary limited-purpose
public figure.

See Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742,

In Darneron, the

Plaintiff, who "by sheer bad luck" happened to be on duty the
night of the Mt. Weather airplane crash, was dragged, by no fault
of his own, into the subsequent public controversy surrounding
air-traffic safety.

See Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742.

The court

held that the plaintiff was an involuntary public figure, because
he did not purposefully seek public attention but was drawn into
the controversy by no purposeful action of his own.
741.

The court stated that the plaintiff was an "ordinary

citizen .
.

See id. at

. . completely unknown to the public before the [crash]

. . and never acquired notoriety apart from the crash."

Id.

However, the court relied on the heavy official and non-official
investigations of the event to conclude that the plaintiff had
been drawn into the public controversy involuntarily and had
played a significant role in it, even though he was completely
cleared of any wrongdoing.

Id. at 742,

Here, Respondent was likewise also unknown prior to the
controversy, drawn into it "by sheer bad luck" and then the
subject of official and non-official investigations into the
assassination of Senator Kennedy.

As noted above, the Respondent

13

was investigated by the LAPD and FBI and pictured on the cover of
Time in connection to the Kennedy controversy.
1392.)

(R.T. 1342,

Mr. Morrow's book, on which the Globe article is based,

is just one of the more recent investigations into the
controversy surrounding the Robert Kennedy assassination and
espouses a new idea, involving the Respondent, about who was
actually responsible for the killing.

(R.T. 3146.)

Another such

book, as noted above, which discusses Respondent's role in the
controversy was just recently published in 1991 by Jonathan
Bankin: Conspiracies, Coverups and Crimes.

(R.T. 1409.)

Accordingly, like in Dameron, Respondent, here, played more than
a tangential or trivial role in the controversy surrounding the
death of Senator Kennedy.

In sum. Respondent has satisfied the

second part of the involuntary public figure test.
C. The Defamatory Statements Directly Relate to
Respondent's Connection to the Assassination
Controversy.
Limited-purpose public figures lose protection of their
reputation only to the extent that the alleged defamatory
statements directly relate to their roles in public
controversies.

Reader's Digest Assoc, v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.

3d 244, 253-54 (1984).

Here, the statements in the Globe

article, which merely report on the allegations made by Morrow,
"directly relate" to the Respondent's role in the public
controversy surrounding the assassination of Senator Kennedy.
The statements claim that Respondent, in his capacity as a
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photographer, used his position to aid in the assassination of
Senator Kennedy.

(R.T. 3146.)

Thus, plaintiff is an involuntary

public figure for the limited purpose of discussing the
controversy around the assassination of Senator Kennedy, because
all three elements of the test in Bay View Packing are satisfied.
Accordingly, we pray that this Court find in favor of

Globe and

reverse the decision of the lower court.
II.

THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE DOCTRINE SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN
CALIFORNIA BECAUSE IT IS AN EXTENSION OF THE NEW YORK TIMES
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AND COMMON LAW PRIVILEGE OF FAIR
REPORT FOR REPUBLISHERS.
This Court should adopt the neutral reportage privilege

because it is an extension of the constitutional protection for
free press and the common law privilege of fair report.

Absent

the privilege, republishers lose the opportunity to publish,
without reproach, allegations that are of public interest,
because they may be unverifiable or only partially true.

Hence,

newsworthy information would not reach the public.
Neutral reportage protects the publication of newsworthy
issues that are not discussed or alleged during a public
proceeding.

See generally Edwards v. National Audubon Society,

556 F.2d 113 {2d Cir. 1977).

The privilege protects

repiiblication of valuable and newsworthy allegations, not because
the publisher attaches value to the defamation, but because the
allegations concern a public controversy, of public interest,

regarding a public figure.
The determination of whether the neutral reportage privilege
applies is reviewable de novo^ because it implicates First
Amendment constitutional protections for republishers.
Inc. V. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971)

^ Time,

(holding that where there

is a claim of the denial of constitutional rights reviewing
courts are not bound by the conclusions of lower courts but can
review the evidentiary basis of the trial court's conclusions).
A.

The Doctrine of Neutral Reportage Furthers
the Constitutional Protection of Freedom of
Press.

The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
Const, amend. I.

U.S.

The California Constitution elaborates:

"[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his or her
sentiments on all subjects ... A law may not restrain or
abridge liberty of speech or press," as long as the publisher
takes responsibility for her actions.

Cal. Const, art. I, § 2.

Even though there is no complete constitutional protection for
defamatory speech, "a bonus zone of protection is extended to it
nonetheless in order to protect speech that is covered."

Ray

Worthy Cambell, The Developing Privilege of Neutral Reportage, 69
Va. L. Rev. 853, 860 (1983).

'Public figures include limited-purpose involuntary public
figures. See Dameron, 779 F.2d at 741.
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Neutral reportage extends the "bonus zone" of protection to
republishers, while ensuring relief for the defamed plaintiff.
Under the privilege the original defamer is responsible for her
own words, despite their public interest value.

However, the

republisher is not liable for neutrally reporting the statements
of the original declarant.

Without this privilege every

republisher, for fear of liability, will not report the original
newsworthy statement.

This failure to report only frustrates the

possibility of further inquiry and resolution of those issues.
See David Marburger, More Protection for the Press: The Third
Circuit Expands the Fair Report Privilege, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
1143, 1160 (1982),

Furthermore, the republisher's subjective

doubts are irrelevant, because they do not alter the nature of
the newsworthy issues.

See Rodney A. Nelson, Neutral Reportage:

^king Sense of Edwards v. Edwards Audubon Society, Inc., 20 Cap.
U. L. Rev. 471, 492 (1991).

A newsworthy public controversy does

not become any less significant to the public if the reporter
doubts the truth of statements, for it is the public who will
finally decide whether the statements are credible.

S^ i^

Hence, neutral reportage promotes "open debate" and the public's
access to information.
1• Neutral reportage is coexistent with
the Court's interpretation of defamation
raw in Gertz v. Welch.
The neutral reportage privilege is coexistent with Gertz v.
WeL^.

In Gertz, the Court focused on the status of the defamed
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plaintiff as opposed to the newsworthiness of the public
controversy.

See generally 418 U.S. 323.

However, since Gertz,

the Court has utilized a "public interest" analysis to determine
whether a constitutional protection is compelled in defamation
cases.

See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc, v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,

776 (1986)

(holding that plaintiff, a private figure, had to

prove actual malice and falsity of the statements on matters of
public concern in order to recover damages); Dun & Bradstreet
Inc. V. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1984)

(allowing

plaintiff, a private figure, to recover presumed and punitive
damages absent a showing of actual malice only because there was
no p\iblic controversy).

In Hepps, the Court merely extended the

holding in Dun & Bradstreet, which distinguished between private
figures connected with public controversies and private figures
involved in private controversies.

475 U.S. at 775-76.

Hence,

by distinguishing between private figures who are involved in
private matters and those involved in public controversies, the
Court has not abandoned a public concern analysis.
Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763.

See Dun &

Therefore, neutral reportage, which

focuses on the newsworthiness of the public controversy, as
opposed to the author's subjective belief in its veracity or the
status of the plaintiff, is in line with the Court's current
constitutional analysis as it concerns private and public
plaintiffs.
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2. Neutral reportage is in accordance with
New York Times v» Sullivan^s actual malice
standard.
Neutral reportage arises from the same First Amendment
concerns as the actual malice standard.

See Justin H. Wertman,

The Newsworthiness Requirement of the Privilege of Neutral
Reportage is a Matter of Public Concern, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 789,
797 (1996).

However, it differs from New York Times in that it

protects republishers who have subjective doubt as to the truth
of the substantive allegations, but report the charges neutrally
and accurately.

The falsehood is not afforded the protection,

rather it is the reporting of the allegations that are shielded.
Moreover, the injured plaintiff is not barred relief, but can
seek dcunages for the defamatory falsehood against the original
libelant.
Unlike original publications, republications have two tiers
of truth or falsity.

The first is the truth or falsity of the

defamatory remark of the original source.

See James E, Boasberg,

With Malice Toward None: A New Look At Defamatory Republication
and Neutral Reportage, 13 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 455, 467
(1991) .

The second is the truth or falsity of the report on the

defamatory remarks.

See id.

The neutral reportage privilege

does not protect the underlying defamatory remark, but protects
the newspaper in its accurate report about the allegation the
source has made.

See id.

The privilege exists because there is

19

a need for reporting newsworthy allegations that might be
unverifiable.

Hence, the privilege is not an appendage to the

actual malice test established in New York Times, but is a new
and coexistent breed of constitutional protection,
B. The Doctrine of Neutral Reportage Is Also Rooted
in the Common Law Privilege of Fair Report.
The common law privilege of fair report protects the fair
and accurate reporting of any statement uttered in judicial,
legislative or executive proceedings about public or private
figures.

Mark W. Page, Price v. Viking Penguin,

Inc.: The

Neutral Reportage Privilege and Robust, Wide Open Debate, 75
Minn. L. Rev. 157, 161-62 (1990).

Thus, the fair report

privilege provides republishers with a broader protection than
the New York Times "actual malice" standard alone and implicitly
recognizes that the republished statements promote selfgovernment "merely because they are said" irrespective of the
author's subjective belief in their veracity.

See Comment,

Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation, 77 Colum. L,
Rev. 1266, 1269 (1977).
Similarly, neutral reportage protects republished
allegations solely for their informational purposes.

See Scott

E. Saef, Neutral Reportage: The Case for a Statutory Privilege,
86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 417, 424 (1992).

In New York Times, the Court

reasoned that "protection of the public requires not merely
discussion, but information."
U.S. 254, 272 (1964).

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376

Hence, the unobstructed dissemination of
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newsworthy information protects the public's right to selfgovernance.

Neutral reportage protects the "vital pulse of ideas

and intelligence on which an informed self-governing people
depend."

Edwards^ 556 F.2d at 122.

The public interest resides

in the need for full disclosure of information about
controversies that rage around "sensitive issues."

Id. at 120.

Ultimately, the republisher, or informer, may be the only link
between the newsworthy statement and the public.

Thus, the

republisher must be afforded the neutral reportage
constitutionally-based protection to disseminate newsworthy
information.
C. The Constitutional and Common Law Foundation for
the Neutral Reportage Privilege Has Been Acknowledged
in California Case Law.
California case law protects speech of public interest that
is reported accurately and neutrally regardless of the author's
subjective doubt in the allegations.
102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 148 (1980).

See Weingarten v. Block,

In Weingarten, the court

implicitly supported the underlying elements of the privilege.
The court held that under the First Amendment the republication
of newsworthy public controversies are privileged, regardless of
the author's doubts about their veracity.

See id.

The court

emphasized the need for public access to information about public
controversies without assuming responsibility of original libel.
See id.
Similarly, in Grillo v. Smith, 144 Cal. App. 3d 868, 872
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(1983),

the court afforded statements of opinion absolute

privilege.

Citing Edwards, the Grillo court emphasized the

importance of providing "double protection" for third party
opinions such as those of republishers.

See id.

Even though

Grillo concerned the protection of opinions, the underlying
rationale is the same: to serve the public interest, a
republisher must have freedom to report allegations without
assuming liability.

See id.

(citing Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120;

referring to Weingarten, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 148.)
Moreover, in Grillo the Court held that a publisher is not
responsible for the strained interpretation a reader might attach
to its words in the publication.

144 Cal. App. 3d at 874.

Therefore, courts must refrain from "scrutinizing what is not
said to find 'a defamatory meaning which the article does not
convey to a lay reader.'"

See Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d

792, 803 (1980) (quoting Mullins v. Thieriot, 19 Cal. App. 3d 302,
304 (1971)).
The Grillo and Forsher courts relax the common law rule that
holds republishers liable for the republication of potentially
defamatory statements made by the original publisher.
V.

McClatchy, 111 Cal. 606, 612 (1896)

See Gilman

(for the common law rule.)

Grillo and Forsher, in modifying Gilman, imply that if the
cumulative effect of a publication is neutral and accurate, then
republishers should not be liable for the unreasonable reader's
strained interpretation of reports.
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Therefore, the republisher

who accurately republishes news of public interest should be
privileged.
III.

THE GLOBE ARTICLE IS AN ACCURATE AND NEUTRAL REPORT OF
A NEWSWORTHY STATEMENT PRIVILEGED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
NEUTR7U. REPORTAGE.
In exercising its First Amendment privilege, the Globe

neutrally and accurately informed the public about a newsworthy
publication which concerned a public controversy: the
assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy.

Hence, the article

satisfies the elements of neutral reportage as defined in Edwards
and developed in subsequent case law:

(1) the republisher must

neutrally and accurately republish allegations,

(2)

about a

public figure involved in a newsworthy controversy (3) made by a
third source.
A. The Globe Article Is a Neutral and Accurate
Republication of Allegations About a LimitedPurpose Public Figure Concerning a Public
Controversy.
The Globe article, through the use of disclaimers, neutrally
and accurately reports the charges against Respondent made by a
responsible third source, ex-Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA")
agent Mr. Robert Morrow.

Here, Respondent is an involuntary

limited-purpose public figure who was drawn into the vortex of
the Kennedy assassination.

Furthermore, the allegations made by

Mr. Morrow and accurately republished by Globe, concern
Respondent in his connection to that public controversy.
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1. The Globe article is a neutral and accurate
republication about a limited-purpose public
figure«
Globe accurately and neutrally republished the allegations
about Respondent, a limited-purpose public figure, made by
Mr. Robert Morrow in his book The Senator Must Die.

Mr. Jonathan

L. Kirsch, Globe's expert witness and contributor to the Los
Angeles Times, testified that the use of terms such as "Morrow
claims" and "Morrow charges" indicate to the reader that "there's
a disclaimer, that [Globe] is not standing behind the charges
that they're reporting on."

(R.T. 859:18-20.)

Globe was not

endorsing or exaggerating the allegations, but merely reporting
the allegations of the book in a disinterested manner.
Globe, an international magazine, is in the business of
informing its readers about public controversies.

This Court

should not base a defamation finding, nor hold the paper
responsible, for strained interpretations of its many readers.
See Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Assn, v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14
(1970).

Therefore, this Court's analysis should focus upon the

reasonable reader.
In Greenbelt, the Supreme Court used a "reasonable reader"
focus to deter strained interpretations of "rhetorical" or
"vigorous epithet" such as the term "blackmail."

See id.

There,

the Greenbelt News Review reported that at several public
meetings people classified the plaintiff's negotiating position
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as "blackmail."

See id. at 7.

The word "blackmail" appeared

several times with and without quotation marks and was used once
as a subheading within a newsstory.

See id. at 7-8.

The Court

held that the reasonable reader would not have concluded that the
Greenbelt Review was imputing a crime on the plaintiff by using
the word "blackmail."

See id. at 13.

Instead, the word was used

as "rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet" to demonstrate the
declarant's views about plaintiff.

Id. at 14.

Here, the Globe's use of terms such as "dramatic new
evidence reveals" is not dispositive of its exaggeration of the
allegations.

Under Greenbelt the Court would necessarily

conclude that Globe did not endorse or exaggerate Mr. Morrow's
theory.

Any other conclusion would be a strained interpretation.

Similar to the word "blackmail," "dramatic evidence reveals" is a
"rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet,"

Id.

Therefore, when

interpreting such language this Court should avoid a strained
interpretation in order to find malicious motives on the part of
Globe.

Ultimately, the decision to use phrases such as,

"dramatic evidence reveals" is merely a "valid exercise of
literary license."

See Reader's Digest Assoc., 37 Cal. 3d at

262.
A neutral and accurate report does not have to recount the
literal words of the original declarant.
at 120.

See Edwards, 556 F.2d

A republication containing the essence of the original

publication, though not in its original language, may be
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privileged from suit as long as it fairly and accurately recounts
the allegations against the third person.
285-86.

See Pape, 401 U.S. at

In Pape the republication concerned a report put out by

the Civil Rights Commission.

The publication was considered

privileged even though both the author of the article and the
researcher "admitted an awareness at the time of the publication
that the wording of the Commission Report had been significantly
altered."

Id.

The Court concluded that the New York Times

omission of the word "alleged" from the republication did not
amount to a "falsification" in order to sustain a jury finding of
actual malice.

See id. at 289.

Similarly, Globe did not have to

republish literal words written or spoken by Mr. Morrow.

In

fact, like the author in Pape, Mr. Blackburn testified that the
published article was a "fair rewrite of what [he] submitted [to
the Globe]."

(R.T. 1107:2-4.)

Hence, he saw "no conflicts

between this story, and what [he] originally submitted [to the
Globe]."

(R.T, 1107:2-4.)

To determine the accuracy of the Globe article, as it
recounts Mr. Morrow's allegations, the court must take the
republication in its entire context.

See generally Forsher, 26

Cal. 3d at 803 (stating that to determine whether statements are
libelous the court must look at "what is explicitly stated as
well as what insinuation and implication can be reasonably drawn
from the communication").

Therefore, even though the photograph

was used without the knowledge of Mr. Blackburn, its inclusion
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did not alter the neutral content of the report.
is a reproduction from the book.

The photograph

An excerpt from the book

contains similar shots of Respondent at the podium with Senator
Kennedy under which the caption reads: "Ali Ahmand in sweater
next to Robert Kennedy minutes before Kennedy was assassinated."
(Court Transcript ("C.T.") 156, 172, 173.)

The arrow, used by

Globe, is the functional equivalent of the captions in the book,
it points out the position of Ali Ahmand in the picture.^
Finally, the First Amendment protection of free press is not
limited to statements "whose validity are beyond question or
which reflect an objective picture of the reported events."
Weingarten, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 151.

See

Here, Mr. Blackburn, who

had no reason to doubt the veracity of his source, was not
required to obtain Respondent's version of the events, see id. at
147, or provide an objective picture, see New York Times Co. v.
Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1966), or verify his
information, see Fadell v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 425 F.
Supp. 1075, 1085 (N.D. Ind. 1976).

Moreover, Mr. Blackburn was

not obligated to investigate Mr. Morrow's allegations, because
Globe lacked actual malice and did not concur or exaggerate in
the allegations.

See In re United Press Int'l, 106 B.R. 323, 330

(D.C, Cir. 1989)(holding that there is no duty to conduct further

^Furthermore, the trial judge's sua sponte, post trial finding
that the photographs did not match should be given no weight
during de novo review. The issue regarding the neutrality of the
photograph was not being litigated by the parties.
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investigation if republisher did not concur or exaggerate in the
allegations).
If the doctrine of neutral reportage were to require that
republishers conduct additional investigations/ the privilege
would be useless.

The goal of neutral reportage is to protect

the republisher who has subjective doubt about the veracity of
the allegations, but nonetheless reports the news, allowing the
public to decide the truth of the matter asserted.
2. The Globe article reported on a newsworthy
allegation of public concern surrounding the
assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy.
In Edwards, the court held that given the newsworthiness of
the allegations and the First Amendment right to free press, the
New York Times was not required to suppress the republication of
the statements made by the Audubon Society about supporters of
the insecticide DDT.

556 F.2d at 113.

Therefore, an accurate

republication of a statement of public interest made by a
prominent and responsible source, such as the Audubon Society,
bars any liability on the part of the republisher, regardless of
her subjective belief about the validity of the news story.
id.

See

The statements or accusations made by the Audubon Society

were newsworthy simply because "they were made."

See id. at 119.

Similarly the Globe article is a report on a matter of
public interest: the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy.
The article merely informs the public about the existence of a
book that contains noteworthy and newsworthy allegations.
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The

publication is newsworthy because it directly relates to the
assassination of a member of the Kennedy family, one of the most
prominent and public families in the nation.
Furthermore, the prominent press frequently treats the
publication of a book as a newsworthy event.

(R.T. 1599.)

For

example, in a 1993 article, the Los Angeles Times announced the
publication of the book Spider's Web in exactly the same manner
as the Globe article.

(R.T. 1599-1600.)

Similarly, in a 1994

article, the New York Times reported about the publication of
Opening Argument in the same manner as the Globe article.

(R.T.

1600.)

All three reports. New York Times, Los Angeles Times and

Globe,

are "new articles which treat the publication of a book

as a newsworthy event."

(R.T. 1600:9-10.)

By denying the

privilege to republish and inform the public, the court
discourages the dissemination of news and ideas and undermines
the United States Supreme Court's intent to preserve the
"'unfettered interchange of ideas for bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people.'"

See New York Times,

376 U.S. at 269 (citation omitted.)
In sum, the accurate and disinterested reporting of a
newsworthy event serves the public interest by fully informing
members of the public about controversies that concern them.
Such issues demand "that the [republishers] be afforded the
freedom to report [newsworthy issues] without responsibility for
[their ultimate accuracy.]"

See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 119.
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3, The original newsworthy statement was made by
a responsible and prominent source.
The neutral reportage privilege protects newsworthy publications
made by prominent and responsible sources.

See Edwards/ 556 F.2d

122 (source of the allegation was the Audubon Society, a
responsible and "well-noted organization"); see also

Barry v.

Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1126 (N.D, Cal. 1984)

(eradicating

the trustworthiness requirement).

Here, Mr. Morrow had

established prominence in his field.

For example, his first

book, Betrayal, made possible the creation of the House Select
Committee on Assassinations.

(R.T. 842-43.)

Moreover,

Congressman Dawning's letter to Mr. Morrow, included in the book
The Senator Must Die,

(R.T. 841-42), stated that "[ijt [was] no

exaggeration to say that the information [in Betrayal] coupled
with additional confidential material supplied to him by
Mr. Morrow, helped make the creation of the House Select
Committee on Assassinations possible."

(R.T. 843:12-18.)

Mr. Blackburn could reasonably rely on Mr. Morrow's
expertise in the subject area of conspiracies given that
Roundtable Publishing identified him as both a former CIA
contract agent and agent.

(R.T. 848.)

In fact, Mr. Blackburn

testified there was nothing in the book to concern him about Mr,
Morrow's background or credibility.

(R.T, 1095.)

Hence, Globe's

neutral and accurate report of Mr. Morrow's allegations is
privileged under neutral reportage.
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B.

Alternatively/ the Neutral Reportage Privilege
Should Be Extended to Publications Regarding
Private Figures Involved in Public Controversies,

There is no legitimate difference between the republisher's
accurate and neutral reporting of allegations made against a
private figure and "those made against a public figure, when the
accusations themselves are newsworthy and concern a matter of
public interest."
466, 469 (1988).

April v. Reflector-Herald, Inc., 546 N.E,2d
Neutral reportage protects the public's access

to information and self government.

These values do not become

any less important when the status of the plaintiff changes, but
the controversy is of public concern.
776,

See Hepps, 475 U.S. at

The fact that a statement is "newsworthy" or of public

interests is mutually exclusive from the status of the plaintiff.
See Marburger, supra at 17.

Therefore, even if this Court finds

Respondent to be a private figure, the neutral reportage
privilege still applies, because the accurate and neutral
republisher is not the one purporting the falsehood.
Furthermore, the privilege does not effect private figures'
cause of action against the original libelant.

The privilege

would also place original publishers on notice to exercise a
greater degree of care when writing about private figures.
Hence, as the April court noted, there is no legitimate
difference between the press' accurate reporting of accusations
made against private figure and those made against a public
figures, especially when the accusations themselves are
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newsworthy and concern a matter of public interest.

See April,

546 N.E.2d at 469.
IV.

GLOBE LACKED THE NECESS7VRY CONSTITUTIONAL MALICE
REQUIRED FOR RESPONDENT TO RECOVER IN THIS ACTION.
The doctrine that originated in New York Times culminated in

the seminal exposition on constitutional "actual malice" in the
case of St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).

This Court

has since followed the definition of actual malice set forth in
that case.

See McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal, 3d 835, 847 (1986)

(relying on St. Amant for guidance).

Globe failed to publish

its report of Robert Morrow's book with the requisite actual
malice required by St. TVnant, and we therefore ask this Court to
reverse the decision of the lower court and find in favor of
Globe.

This Court must "independently decide whether the

evidence" is sufficient to strip the defendant of constitutional
protection.

McCoy, 42 Cal. 3d at 842.

the issue of actual malice de novo.
A,

Thus, this Court reviews

Id.

Respondent Has Failed to Show by Clear and Convincing
Evidence That Globe Acted Knowingly or With Reckless
Disregard of the Falsity of the Statements.

Actual malice is defined as acting with knowledge that the
statements were false or with a reckless disregard as to their
falsity.

See New York Times, 376 U.S, at 279-80.

Reckless

disregard does not ask if a reasonable person would have
published the statements but, rather, if the evidence is clear
and convincing that the defendant "in fact entertained serious
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doubts as the truth of his publication."
731.

St, Amant/ 390 U.S. at

The defendant must have exhibited a "'high degree of

awareness of , . , probable falsity.'"

Id.

(citation omitted.)

But such reckless disregard cannot be "encompassed in one
infallible definition . . .

[but must] be marked out through

case-by-case adjudication,"

at 730.

In St. Amant, a political candidate, the petitioner St.
Amant, made a televised speech in which he revealed the details
of a question and answer session he had with a member of the
Teamsters Union local.

390 U.S. at 728.

The questioning

concerned alleged "nefarious" activities by the president of the
local.

See id.

The Teamster member implicated a local deputy

sheriff, the respondent Thompson.

See id.

The Teamster member

indicated that money had passed hands between the president of
the local and Thompson in a plan to "[secret] union records."
at 728-29.

The Court accepted the lower court's finding that

the statements were false, but held that Thompson had failed to
prove actual malice.

See id. at 730.

The Court found nothing in the record which gave rise to "an
awareness by St. Amant" that the statements were false; as such,
mere failure to investigate was insufficient to establish actual
malice.

Id. at 733.

Moreover, St. Amant's failure to recognize

the "import" of the statements and the possible consequences for
Thompson was also insufficient to establish actual malice.

See

Finally, the Court stated that the lack of evidence with
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regard to the reliability of the Teamster member and his
reputation for veracity underscored Thompson's failure to
demonstrate a "low community assessment of [the Teamster
member's] trustworthiness or unsatisfactory experience with him
by St. Amant."

Id.

Accordingly, the Court held that Thompson

had failed to prove St. Amant had knowledge that the statements
were false or acted in reckless disregard of the truth.

See id.

at 730.
Similarly, here, Respondent failed to prove that the Globe,
and more particularly, Mr. Blackburn, the author of the article
in question, acted with the requisite actual malice.

The record

contains no evidence that Mr. Blackburn entertained serious
doubts about the truthfulness of the information in Mr. Morrow's
book.

Nor did the Respondent prove in any way that Mr. Morrow or

Roundtable, the publisher of Mr. Morrow's book, were unreliable
and, therefore, in "low community" standing with regard to their
trustworthiness.

In fact, the record proves quite the opposite.

Mr. Blackburn had every reason to believe that the statements in
Mr. Morrow's book could be true.
First, Mr. Morrow told Mr. Blackburn in their interview that
his previous book. Betrayal, had led to the formation of the
House Select Committee on Assassinations.

(R.T. 841.)

Mr. Morrow had a letter from Congressman Downing, who initiated
the committee, which stated that Mr. Morrow's theory on the death
of John F, Kennedy was remarkably plausible.
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(R.T. 841.)

Second/ Mr. Morrow indicated that he had in the past worked
as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative.

(R.T. 847.)

This fact could not be substantiated by Mr. Blackburn, because if
Mr. Morrow was an operative, the CIA would not reveal that fact.
(R.T. 855.)

As proof, however, Mr. Morrow produced a letter

written by Richard Nixon, asking for leniency by the court in a
case in which Mr. Morrow and his confidant in the CIA were being
tried for counterfeiting Cuban money, which they contended was in
aid of the anti-Castro movement headed by the CIA.

(R.T. 852.)

Third, the forward to Mr. Morrow's book, The Senator Must
Die, was written by Colonel Prouty, a well-known conspiracy
theorist and technical advisor to Oliver Stone on the film JFK.
(R.T. 882.)

Mr. Blackburn testified that he knew Colonel Prouty,

but he could not remember if he called him after the interview
with Mr. Morrow.

(R.T. 1084.)

Regardless of whether he called,

the fact that Mr. Blackburn knew Colonel Prouty and that Colonel
Prouty wrote the forward to Mr. Morrow's book was sufficient for
Mr. Blackburn to reasonably and in good faith rely on Colonel
Prouty's support for the book.
Fourth, Mr. Blackburn testified that he knew Thomas Naguchi,
the coroner who performed the autopsy on Robert Kennedy, and that
this fact made the statements and claims in Mr, Morrow's book
plausible.

(R.T. 1124.)

Mr. Naguchi had previously written his

own book expounding on a conspiracy surrounding the death of
Robert Kennedy.

(R.T, 892.)

Mr. Naguchi had previously told
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Mr. Blackburn that there was more than one gunman based on the
findings of his autopsy, which revealed that a bullet entered
Robert Kennedy's head from behind.

(R.T. 1124.)

This inevitably

led Mr. Blackburn to believe that Mr. Morrow's theory was a
serious possibility.
Finally, Respondent's own expert witness, Robert Kaiser, the
author of RFK Must Die, testified that he thought Mr. Morrow was
not completely sane.

(R.T. 2151.)

However, Mr. Kaiser in his

own book specifically asks why the Respondent, in such close
proximity to Robert Kennedy on the night of the killing, had not
been interviewed as a suspect.

(R.T. 1408.)

Mr. Kaiser, a conspiracy theorist himself, obviously thought
at the time he wrote RFK Must Die that it was possible Respondent
could have played a part in the assassination of Robert Kennedy.
Mr. Kaiser could not now support Mr. Morrow's theory without
debunking his own, and thereby damaging his own credibility.
Lacking a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity
of the statements or serious doubts as to their truthfulness,
Mr. Blackburn did not publish his article with actual malice as
defined by the Court in St. Amant and accepted by this Court in
McCoy.

42 Cal. 3d at 864.

Moreover, any failure to investigate

by Mr. BlacJcburn, without a high degree of awareness of probable
falsity, is insufficient under St. Amant to warrant a finding of
actual malice.

390 U.S. at 733; see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323

(citing St. Amant as authority).

Mr. Blackburn was justified in
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presenting one side of the story so long as he lacked serious
doubts - i.e., actual malice.
259.

See Reader's Digest, 37 Cal. 3d at

Malice is strictly a subjective test# interested solely in

the defendant's state of mind regarding the truthfulness of the
statements.

See id, at 257.

The Respondent has failed to show

by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Blackburn harbored
serious doubts about the truthfulness of the statements.

Thus#

Respondent has failed to prove the actual malice as required by
St. Amant.

Accordingly, this Court is asked to find in favor of

the Globe.
B.

Even If This Court Finds Respondent To Be a Private
Figure# He Still Must Prove Constitutional Malice
In Order To Recover Punitive or Presumed Damages#
Because the Statements Concerned a Public Controversy.

Private individuals must prove constitutional malice in
order to recover presumed or punitive damages in a defamation
suit.

See Gertz# 418 U.S. at 349,

The Court later qualified

this rule by requiring that a private plaintiff must only show
actual malice if the defamatory statement go directly to an issue
of public concern.

See Dun & Bradstreet# 472 U.S. at 761.

As shown above# in section I (A), the defamatory statements here
go directly to a public controversy.

Therefore, if this Court

finds the Respondent to be a private figure# he must still prove
actual malice by substantial evidence.

However# as shown above,

in section 11(A), Respondent has failed to make such a showing;
therefore, should this Court find Respondent to be a private
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figure# we pray that the Court reverse the award of punitive and
presumed damages.
CONCLUSION
Respondent is an involuntary limited-purpose public figure
regard to the public controversy surrounding the
assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy because he was drawn
into the controversy and played more than a tangential or trivial
role.

Mr. Morrow, in his book The Senator Must Die, alleged that

Respondent was connected to the assassination.

Globe neutrally

and accurately reported these allegations; therefore. Globe
should be privileged under the doctrine of neutral reportage.
Neutral reportage, an extension of the constitutional protection
of free press and common law privilege of fair report, should be
adopted in California and applied to both public and private
figures.

Finally, Respondent failed to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the article was published with actual
malice.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of
Appeal for the Second District should be reversed.
Dated:

October

29, 1997

Counsel for Petitioner
Globe International, Inc.
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